This paper asks two questions: i) how does the proximity and relative amount of lending by competitors affect where a bank with a local capital shock adjusts supply of credit? ii) do credit supply shocks have a lower impact on real activity if they help the bank compete in the core markets of other lenders? Evidence shows that positive shocks help offset distance-based information disadvantage and target markets far from own branches and close to competitors' branches. Negative shocks occur in competitive, low-share markets with lower marginal return. Activity increases significantly in concentrated markets when banks expand in their own or competitors' core markets.
Introduction
Banks frequently provide credit to a segment of the market with significant information frictions. When lending locally, soft information gives banks an advantage in the proximity of their branches and allows for increased competition at the periphery, where others gain an advantage.
1 Additional capital provides lenders an opportunity to expand their lending portfolio close to competitors or in their own core markets, far from other lenders. Similarly, when capital decreases, banks can reduce lending in either of the markets. The way capital shocks are allocated to markets with different level of competition, has an implication for the segmentation of credit markets and for the role of physical branches in preventing lending from competing banks. For example, if a bank with additional capital does not lend more close to the branches of a competitor, lending in the proximity is likely more expensive. The existing evidence shows that branches minimize contracting frictions due to own distance to borrowers.
2 At the same time, there is less evidence about the role of branches in increasing contracting frictions for other competing banks.
This paper asks two questions: i) how does the proximity and relative amount of lending by competitors affect where a bank with a local capital shock adjusts the supply of credit?
ii) do credit supply shocks have a lower impact on real activity if they help the bank compete in the core markets of other lenders? According to the literature on local lending, the share of originations in a given location depends on the lender's own distance to the borrower and the distance of the borrower to other banks. 3 The insight provides a starting point for the empirical analysis in this paper and is key to how I distinguish which markets see credit supply changes after two local capital shocks. I explicitly incorporate measures of bankborrower/competitor-borrower distance and the share of lending at the borrower's census tract as measures of local competition. Both can explain where and how much a bank lends within and across counties and how much credit supply and real activity shift after capital shocks. The existing literature primarily focuses on whether lending changes in counties with/without own branches, identifying the role of the own distance-to-borrower information advantage in a starkly discontinuous way. 4 This ignores the presence of other lenders and does not explain how credit is allocated within or across counties with branches. 5 Degryse and Ongena (2005) and Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) show that the location of other lenders is key to where a bank lends. Furthermore, Cortés and Strahan (2017) suggests that, for smaller banks, most of mortgage lending is close to branches, implying that loans in nobranch counties make up a small fraction of the portfolio. 6 Therefore, the existing evidence does not explain how capital shocks are distributed across the markets where banks lend the most and whether the location of other lenders plays an important role.
My main results examine small business loans by regional banks which face incentives to reallocate capital due to their exposure to fracking windfalls and residential booms. I explore a different credit segment relative to the existing evidence, which focuses on mortgage lending. Business lending is more local, is subject to higher information frictions, and can be directly linked to employment outcomes. I use a novel dataset that combines the joint spatial distribution of borrowers and lenders, and identifies lending in each census tract by branches of each bank. This level of detail allows me to measure how far other lenders are and what their share of lending within each tract is. I estimate a difference-in-difference model, which relies on the significant existing variation to account for time-invariant branch or branch-borrower heterogeneity and time-varying census-tract demand shocks. 4 See Gilje et al. (2016) , Cortés and Strahan (2017) . Papers also examine how credit segments subject to greater contracting frictions respond to capital shocks.
5 While it is true that the contracting frictions are higher in counties where banks do not have branches compared to where they do, the information advantage can vary within and across counties where banks have branches depending on the distance of competitors to borrowers.
6 Brevoort and Hannan (2006) suggests that this is the case for business lending as well. 7 The dataset draws on the CRA lending data and SOD branch data. CRA refers to the Community Reinvestment Act data on small business lending. SOD refers to the Summary of Deposits data by FDIC which lists bank branch locations.
I start by confirming the existing evidence that fracking and residential booms incentivize capital reallocation and show that business lending is also affected, primarily at small banks: fracking raises lending in outlying markets, while booms lead to lending reductions. This sets the stage for my focus on small banks and the two sets of findings related to lending.
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First, using only local loan share and exposure to capital shocks, I show that originations are more sensitive to capital shocks at census tracts of borrowers where the bank provides a smaller fraction of the overall credit. In particular, credit increases more in lower-share census tracts after a positive capital shock. The result is not in line with Gilje et al. (2016) which shows that credit does not increase in no-branch counties, which are likely low-share markets. It implies that the logic from how banks adjust in no-branch counties does not carry over to all markets and emphasizes that lending by competitors may be an important factor.
I further find that credit decreases more in low-share census tracts following a negative capital shock. This appears to be driven by markets where the branches of both the affected bank and its competitors are close to each other. This result is somewhat at odds with Cortés and Strahan (2017) who find that banks reduce lending in no-branch counties. Instead, I
show that reductions occur where all banks have lower shares.
In the second set of findings I control for the loan share, the distance of borrowers to own and competing branches, and further cut the sample into census tracts close/far from competitors. I show that banks use additional capital to expand the share in census tracts that are close to competitors' branches. I also find evidence that lending increases in tracts where competitors are far from the borrower but the affected bank is close. Expanding close to competitors suggests that positive capital shocks allow banks to lend where they are at an informational disadvantage. This is a new result from the perspective of Gilje et al. (2016) which suggests that banks expand only where they have an information advantage.
It appears that while banks prefer to expand in counties with own branches, they also focus on markets where the benefit of their local presence is offset by the proximity of competitors.
8 Bank size is defined based on the number of branches. Small banks have less than 30 branches.
In the case of real estate booms, I find that banks contract primarily in markets where their branches are close to branches of competitors, i.e. where both have similar information advantage. Since these markets are likely more competitive locations with lower contracting frictions, this finding is consistent with conclusion of Cortés and Strahan (2017) that banks cut where they are not able to generate rents. Still, contrary to that paper, I do not find contractions far from own branches, in markets where the bank has no physical presence.
All together, the evidence suggests that positive capital shocks allow banks to overcome the information disadvantage they face when lending close to competitors, besides also helping them lend more where they have superior local information. During contractions banks reduce originations mostly in competitive markets with lower relative return, where they have the same information advantage as their competitors. They maintain lending to borrowers close to their own branches and far from the competition, as well as in the markets far from own branches and close to the competitors.
The results in the literature on local capital shocks highlight the importance of local branches in alleviating contracting frictions with local borrowers. Expansions occur only in counties with branches, since frictions are lower when the bank distance to the borrower is smaller. My evidence further extends these results by showing that local branches can prevent but not fully eliminate lending by competitors, since only banks with lower cost of funding can expand in the proximity. Furthermore, lending close to competitors is valuable since originations in the proximity are not reduced during negative capital shocks. This suggests that maintaining a physical branch close to borrowers can not only reduce the bank's contracting frictions with borrowers but also help limit competition from other lenders.
Having established that capital shocks lead to important changes in the credit supply by individual banks, I evaluate the overall effect of these on total credit supply and real activity. I show that the average census tract exposed to positive supply shocks, experiences and increase in total business lending and business activity (measured by the number of small business establishments). Since the lending results show that banks lend more in tracts where they have an information disadvantage and also where they have better information, I report results based on the local share of affected banks and the level of competition in the census tract. In particular, I examine whether increased credit supply by banks with a small share of local lending can increase total credit and real activity in tracts that are less competitive.
This allows me to tests whether the expansion by banks in census tracts where they have an information disadvantage has real effects. The evidence indicates that this is indeed the case. I show that positive credit supply shocks increase the number of establishments in tracts close to the branches of competitors and far from the branches of the expanding bank. I also show that activity increases when affected banks lend more close to their own branches and far from competitors. Finally, the evidence suggests that exposure to banks in residential booms reduces total lending but not overall activity. Activity is only lower in markets with bigger reductions compared to other exposed locations.
Positive shocks allow banks to expand in valuable markets: their own core markets and the core markets of competitors, where they lack information advantage. This not only raises total market credit but also increases activity. My results highlight a different aspect of the lending channel -credit supply shocks have real effects in markets where lenders have lower information advantage. Exposure to fracking reduces funding costs, allowing banks to offset their informational disadvantage and compete in markets dominated by competitors.
This mechanism is reminiscent of the effect of the de-regulation of banking, which improved bank competition and increased real activity.
9 Finally, I show that negative capital shocks decrease total credit supply but not the number of loans which suggests that businesses are able to substitute credit, likely since this occurs in competitive markets or in areas closer to competitors, where credit alternatives are available.
I show that fracking or residential booms proximity increases small bank liquidity and profitability, driving supply reallocation. One standard deviation increase in fracking exposure raises branch/bank deposits by 4.3%/.6%, between 2000 and 2010. Tract credit increases 9 See Cetorelli (2001 Cetorelli ( , 2002 ; Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) .
by 9.5%, with branch fixed effects and tract demand controls. One standard deviation higher network fraction where residential appreciation is over the 97 th percentile, during 2000 to 2005, increases yield by 7-13bps. Capital is allocated to booms, reducing tract credit by 21%. The profitability and liquidity of big banks appears to be less sensitive to local shocks.
I find that originations are more sensitive in small-share markets both for contraction and expansions. When the tract loan share is 10% below the bank average, the positive/negative supply effects are 50%/23% bigger in magnitude. To further understand the role of proximity to competitors, I divide the sample by borrowers close/far from competitors, including the loan share and distance to borrowers as explanatory variables. For borrowers close to competitors, expansions are 9% higher when the loan market share is 10% blow the average.
For borrowers far from competitors, expansions increase with proximity to own branches.
In the latter case, originations are 38% higher when the branch and borrower share a tract.
With residential booms, banks reduce more when both their own and competitors' branches are close to borrowers: originations are 83% lower. When competitors are relatively far, banks decrease lending at an intermediate distance to other banks with a similar magnitude.
Tract credit and activity evidence is based on exposure to banks with below/aboveaverage market shares. One standard deviation higher fracking exposure to below/aboveaverage-share banks increases credit by 2.6% (in both cases) and small establishments by 1.1%/0.5%. In the middle/bottom HHI markets low-share lenders increases activity by 0.8%/1.2%. In the rest, high-share lenders increase activity by 1%. Exposure to residential booms reduces total credit between 2.6% and 2.9%. The lower credit supply has no real impact in all but the top HHI markets, where activity decreases relative to tracts with exposure to low-share lenders.
Section 2 lists related literature and contributions. Section 3 discusses data sources. Section 4 defines bank exposure and sample selection. Section 5 shows the bank-level incentives for capital reallocation. Section 6 and 7 deal with credit supply and its effect on total credit and real activity. Section 8 includes robustness/extensions and 9 concludes the paper.
Related Literature
The paper contributes to the literature on intra-bank capital allocations of local shocks. Bustos et al. (2016) and Gilje et al. (2016) examine the effect of local liquidity shocks. Chakraborty et al. (2018) Degryse and Ongena (2005) who show that the distance between the borrower and competing lenders can significantly relax the pricing competition. I also rely on Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) who further
show that the share of lending decreases with the borrower distance to competitors. The models of Hauswald and Marquez (2006) This paper also contributes to the expansive literature on the effect of financial competition on economic growth. This literature uses the branching deregulation legislature and the resulting increase in banking competition across the US to examine its effect on local activity as in Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) and Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) Fracking and Residential Boom Data: Fracking data comes from the U.S. Geological Survey, which examines the development of drilling with hydraulic fracturing up to 2010 (Gallegos and Varela (2015) ). The data has locations of both horizontal and directional wells by the 8-digit hydrologic unit code areas (HUC). The HUCs are comparable to counties in size but do not overlap since they enclose distinct parts of water bodies. The coordinates of each branch help assign it to a HUC and infer the number of drilling wells in the proximity.
The existing fracking literature shows that the purchase of the rights to drill provides a significant payments for the owner of the land (Plosser (2014) ). I use the the number of new horizontal and directional wells in a given area to capture deposit growth.
Residential appreciation comes from Zillow's real estate index. The index is a qualityadjusted median value of housing for a given zip-code, town/city, and county. I construct bank exposure to booms based on the appreciation of real estate in the branch censusdesignated places (CDP). CDPs can be town, cities, or parts of counties. I use the average zip-code and city index data, when available, and the county data when missing. Residential appreciation is based on the CDP's index growth rate.
Bank Exposure and Sample Selection
This paper differentiates between small banks, with less than 30 branches, and big institutions. 13 The literature has provided theoretical and empirical arguments for the difference in the business model and customers of banks of varying size and geographical scope.
14 Smaller banks can be subject to informational frictions in capital markets, making them more dependent on internal capital sources. Higher liquidity affects total bank capital at these institutions, not just the composition. Banks that can increase capital will not generate cross-branch spillovers due to local shocks.
Definition of Fracking Exposure: New fracking wells can lead to a windfall for the land owner. I assume that each branch in the HUC receives a windfall with a likelihood based on the local deposit share. This implies that the same well increase leads to a lower expected deposit growth for branches with more competition. Bank i's exposure is:
B i,t is a set of all bank branches, N ewW ells j,t is total new wells in a hydrological unit area, Results are shown in Table A1 in the online appendix. 17 I find that presence in the top 97 th percentile is most strongly associated with higher earning performance, with a weaker but positive relationship down to the 91 st percentile. Formally the measure of exposure is:
where each branch of bank i is located in a given CDP j. I(Boom) j,i,t indicates if location j of branch i is in the top 97 th percentile of residential appreciation for the region, SBL j,i,t−1 is total lagged small business loans in that location by the branch, and T otalSBL i,t is total bank lending. The period of the sample is between 2000 and 2005. In all specifications, I
15 Bank exposure can be calculated as the total new wells, adjusted for deposit market share, across the entire bank network. I do not use a bank weighted average of branch exposure because new liquidity by assumption will change the relative deposit share in each of the bank markets.
16 I further limit exposed banks to those with 90 th percentile of borrower distance below 60 miles to focus on regional banks.
17 I test whether a higher fraction of branches in locations in the top 99th percentile is associated with higher yield on earning assets, repeating this for fraction of branches throughout the top decile.
exclude areas that experience residential appreciation in the top 91 st percentile. This is consistent with the assumption that proximity to fracking improves liquidity. Comparing small banks based on their presence in the top 97 th percentile markets shows that positive exposure is associated with higher yield on earning assets and net interest margin.
Bank Incentives for Capital Reallocation
The identification in the paper relies on local, non-systemic factors which provide a bank incentive to reallocate capital and adjust the spatial loan portfolio distribution. The shocks help interpret credit changes in the network, outside the direct impact, as supply driven.
Branches in locations close to fracking wells or residential booms can affect the overall bank balance sheet and income statement. I show that fracking exposure changes total deposits and interest expense. Branch deposit information shows that this is related to new fracking wells in the same hydrological area. Increases in deposits expand bank capital, reduce cost of funds, and allow banks to increase credit, particularly if they have limited capital-raising ability. Residential booms allow banks to lend at a higher interest, increasing the yield on earning assets and net interest margin, through capital reallocation.
Branch deposits data can identify where fracking wells increase liquidity by estimating:
Dep i,j,t is the log of deposits at branch j of bank i. The effect of new wells in the proximity, NewWells HU C,t , varies with bank size. Banks with less than 30 offices are designated as small. φ i,j is a branch fixed effect. σ metro,t controls for annual variations in deposit at the metropolitan area. X i t−1 includes bank controls which account for bank-level shocks. The total bank impact of each shock is estimated with the following model:
Y i,t is log deposits, deposit cost, yield on assets, or net interest margin. Exp i,t is bank exposure to fracking or residential booms, φ i /σ state,t are bank/state-year fixed effects. The state-year fixed effect controls for the differential regional shocks by the HQ state. Idiosyn- Estimates of models (3) and (4) in Table 2 suggest that proximity to fracking has a significant bank and branch impact. In column (1), one deviation increase in small/big branch exposure of 1.8/4.1 wells raises branch deposits by 4.3%/2.2%, suggesting that land owners may be more likely to use a smaller bank. Column (2) breaks down the effect by the branch region, indicating that small-bank effects are significant only in the South and West regions, while big-bank branches see increases everywhere. Columns (3) and (4) show that the increases in branch deposit aggregate up to the bank level only for smaller regional banks.
One deviation increase in exposure (4.3 wells) leads to a 0.6% increase in total deposits and a 3 bps decrease in deposit cost. Fracking exposure and the resulting branch deposits provide a significant increase in liquidity without cost increases. Big banks are not affected, implying that jumps in branch deposit are small in relative terms. I restrict bank exposure in what follows to banks with branches in the South and West regions since only they are significant. (5) and (6), raises the yield on assets and the interest margin Loans/Assets, Unused Loan Commitments / Assets, and the change in the number of branches.
by close to 5bps. The increase is even bigger -between 7-13bps -when the effect is allowed to vary by region, in columns (7) and (8). The results likely underestimate the increase in profitability because the non-exposure group includes banks with branches in areas in the top decile of appreciations, which also can experience some increase in profitability. Booms impact the relative profitability across all regions except for the Northeast.
19 As a results, I restrict the definition of exposure to booms by excluding this region. Bigger banks are not affected, highlighting that systemic, rather than regional shocks are more important in explaining variation in the profitability of these banks.
Credit Supply Shocks
Increases in local deposits and profitability impact capital and expected return for the whole institution. More deposits from fracking raise bank capital available for credit. Increase in interest borrowers in residential booms are willing to pay raises the implicit return to capital for all branches and limits capital at offices outside. When exposure to these shocks is partial, the incentive to reallocate links branches and leads to changes in supply at outlying offices.
Credit supply shocks are identified by comparing originations across banks with varying exposure in outlying markets. For the main results, I use branch originations in borrower's census-tract and compare to lending by other tract lenders, assuming common tract shocks.
The baseline credit supply shocks are identified with the following empirical model:
Y i,j,m,t is log of small business lending by branch j of bank i, in tract m. The effect of bank exposure, Exp i,t , varies by bank size, and this is made explicit with the index s, for small banks. φ i,j,m controls for the time-invariant tract differences in originations and rules out the identification of supply shocks by permanent differences in borrowers. η m,t controls for time-varying differences in tract originations. X i,t−1 includes bank controls listed above and big bank exposure. I exclude tracts directly affected by the liquidity or profitability shocks.
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The identification of supply shocks is based on branch tract originations relative to own long-term levels and other banks in the tract. I will not identify these if borrowers of exposed banks have differential demand shocks. Within the same tract, borrowers face the same local factors and common credit variations, accounted with tract-year FE, capture local demand shifts. Results from model (5) with Exp i,t−1 and Exp i,t , show that only Exp i,t−1 matters for fracking and only Exp i,t is significant for booms. I, therefore, use lagged fracking exposure and current booms exposure below. The lending increase that follows higher liquidity rules out timing inconsistencies. No delay in the case of residential booms suggests that banks take advantage of current shocks that improve profitability in these areas.
Spatial competition implicitly constrains where banks will allocate capital. The small business lending literature argues that transportation costs or strategic acquisition of soft information shapes local competition and affects the loan distribution. Information accuracy declines with distance, allowing banks to originate a bigger share closer to their branches and a smaller share closer to competitors. The latter markets are more contested since the bank is constrained by lower information quality and a minimum loan term it can offer. I first examine the importance of market share as a proxy of the effects of local competition:
Sh i,j,m,t−1 is lagged loan share of branch j of bank i in tract m. I center the share at the bank average which implies that α s represents the average supply effect. Positive share captures supply shocks at above-average-share markets and negative share captures those below.
The market share reflects factors of spatial competition as well as the marginal return to capital, bank specialization, first-mover advantage, among others. To account for these independently of local spatial competition, I add distance to own branches and competitors:
RemCom i,j,m is the remoteness to competitors: 1-(1/(1+DistanceToCompetitors)) and ClLend i,j,m is closeness to lender: (1/(1+BorrowerDistance)). The baseline estimates in Table 3 show significant supply changes due to fracking and residential boom exposure, which go in the opposite direction and depend on the level of competition in the market. In columns (1), tract originations increase by 9.3%, for one standard deviation increase in bank exposure, equal to 4.3. Estimates from models (6) and (7) show that the supply effect decreases with the existing market share and increases 21 BorrowerDistance is distance from the branch to the boundary of the borrower tract. DistanceToCompetitors is average distance of the rest of the lenders in the tract, excluding the 15% most distant lenders.
22 For the fracking sample, markets below 0.9 for RemCom i,j,m are Close; for the booms sample, those below 0.8 are Close. I use two different values because the distribution of RemCom i,j,m in the case of fracking and booms is slightly different.
with the distance to competitors. In column (2), 10% below-average market share raises lending by 50% or 15.4% in total. Conversely, markets where banks enjoy higher market share experience smaller supply shocks. Column (3) shows that expansions are higher close to competitors: at 0.8 competitor remoteness, the supply effect is double the baseline and increases closer to competitors. In column (4), I include both the share and distance and find that only share is significant, with a similar magnitude as in column (2). This indicates that the share captures information factors proxied by distance. Lending increases more in markets with lower share because these are generally close to competitors. In column (5), I
focus on the sample of markets close to competitors. Since competitors in this sample are close, the distance of the originating bank tells us if the market is competitive or is the core market of a competitor, where the originating bank lacks an information advantage. I find that the magnitude of the effect of share is even bigger, while distance is not important.
The effect of exposure, at 10% below the average market share, is 55% higher, compared to the same effect for the whole sample. The fact that closeness of the lender is not significant indicates that originations increase both when the bank is located in the same market and when it is farther away. In other words, expansions occur in small-share markets both in the core markets of competitors and in competitive markets. In column (6), which uses the sample of markets far from competitors, closeness to lender is positive and is the only significant coefficient. Expansions occur mostly close to the affected banks, where they have a higher information advantage. The magnitude of the supply effect is much higher in the banks's core markets, compared to the expansion in small-share markets. In the core markets, the effect of exposure is 0.09 when the originating branch is in the same tract as the borrower and in the competitor's core or competitive markets it is 0.02 at 10% below average market share. The results suggest that positive capital shocks are not only allocated to the bank's core markets. They also help expand market share in competitors' core markets, where the improved financial position allows the bank to overcome its information disadvantage, as well as in more competitive areas.
The results in Table 3 for residential booms show that there are substantial credit reductions in outlying tracts. One standard deviation increase in exposure, equal to 0.38, leads to 21% lower originations. A small difference in the yield seems sufficient to induce a relatively substantial reallocation of capital. Allowing for variation in market share in column (8), shows that credit reductions are bigger below the average market share: lending decreases an additional 23% in markets with 10% below-average share, or 26% in total. When only distance measures are included in column (9), credit reductions are strongest in markets closest to competitors. When both share and distance are included in column (10), both preserve their magnitude but the effect of the share is still significant, while remoteness of competitors is marginally significant. As in the case of fracking, the effect of share reflects factors of information advantage and the effect of distance is not significant once the share is included. The estimates from the full sample suggest that reductions are strongest with The share in these markets is important for banks. This is supported not only by the fact that they expand their share when they have more capital but also by the fact that the markets are sheltered during decreases in capital. Both increases and decreases in capital lead to changes in the supply in the competitive markets. Since returns in these markets are likely low, it is not surprising that capital reductions lead to credit contractions in these markets. The fact that lending also increases there after increases in capital suggests that banks have some other advantage or that capital increases exceed the amount of profitable projects in the core and contested markets.
The pattern of capital allocation also shows that credit supply shocks are asymmetric.
Higher capital increases supply in markets where banks can gain market share at the expense of a competitor, in the competitor's core market. Lower capital does not change credit in these contested markets. This highlights that the allocation of capital shocks is motivated by incentives of competition and can insulate some markets from negative supply shocks. This is also the case for the bank's own core markets, which experience increased supply when capital increases but remain unaffected during capital decreases. The evidence shows that low-share markets are generally more sensitive to bank capital shocks. Importantly, the affected small-share markets during positive and negative capital shocks are not the same. Expansions in lending occur in competitive and contested markets; during contractions lending decreases mostly in competitive markets. In the extensions section, I show that the observed credit variations cannot be explained by the bank's incentive to geographically diversify the distribution of its portfolio. I also show that originations at the branch level closely follow those at the level of the tract.
Tract Credit and Real Activity
The evidence so far shows that capital allocation depends on the existing market share.
Positive supply shocks are more significant at below-average-share markets. As a result, a tract with exposed banks may be affected less if these have a higher share, or more with lowshare banks. Furthermore, higher share banks are more important for concentrated markets, where they are more likely to expand if competitors are relatively far. I identify the supply effects on tract credit and activity by separating exposure to small banks according to their share. In the robustness, I also examine the role of changes in local competition.
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This section compares outcomes at different census tracts. To highlight any structural differences between tracts based on exposure to supply shocks, Table 4 reports summary statistics about lending competition and industrial structure. Tracts exposed to both shocks tend to be slightly more competitive and have higher originations, particularly in the case of residential booms. The comparison makes it clear that the empirical model needs to control for tract heterogeneity and exclude those directly impacted by booms or fracking.
Total Market Credit: The empirical model of total tract lending allows for different effect of exposure for banks with above-and below-average loan shares. I distinguish between total lending by bank size and examine how it is affected by tract exposure to each bank size. I estimate the following model, excluding tracts with direct fracking or booms impact: estimates show that banks expand in their core markets and in other banks' core markets.
The interaction term captures how total lending responds when this occurs in the same tract. α s , β s , and γ s can also vary depending on how competitive a census tract is. I divide the HHI distribution into top, middle, and bottom, based on the the 33 rd and 66 th percentiles.
In the case of fracking, both total lending and number of loans increase with tract exposure, and the importance of market share changes with concentration. Column (1) of Table 5 indicates that exposure to banks with blow-and above-average market share increases credit by 2.6% in each case, for one standard deviation increase. Column (2) shows that the loan count at the average tract is not affected by either. Columns (3) and (4) examine differences by market concentration. Total credit in the top/middle HHI markets increases with the presence of both low-and high-share banks, as evidenced by the significant positive effect of the interaction term. The fact that the high-share effect is marginally significant by itself also suggests that tract credit increases more with above-average-share bank exposure. One standard deviation increase in the interaction term of 0.46 increases credit in the top HHI markets by 67% and raises credit by 14% in the middle HHI markets. In the bottom HHI markets, exposure to small-share banks leads to higher credit: one standard deviation leads to 5.4% more credit. Column (4) shows that the loan count increases in a similar fashion with lower magnitude in more competitive markets, indicating higher average loan size.
How consistent are these results with the individual bank reallocation? Banks expand in low-share tracts where they have lower information advantage, or in higher-share markets if these are closer to own branches and far from competitors. The average results show that credit increases with exposure to each. In more concentrated markets, credit does not change only with exposure to high-share banks. Instead, having both low and highshare banks leads to higher lending. This is consistent with the branch results and suggests that tracts part of the core market of an exposed bank see increased originations when a small-share exposed bank tries to expand its share, using its improved financial position to overcame its information disadvantage. In the absence of a small-share lender or in the case when the tract is exposed only to a small-share lender, credit does not change. In the first case, the high-share lender is not challenged and in the second, the small-share lender likely poaches clients from the incumbent. The results suggest that significant tract credit increases occur when an incumbent, with improved liquidity, strategically increases originations to maintain market share as a low-share bank contests the market. Higher small-share exposure in competitive markets indicates that there is a bigger set of exposed lenders which are close to competitors, leading to higher tract credit.
The results in the case of residential booms show that credit deteriorates with tract exposure. In more concentrated markets, this follows exposure to high-share lenders, while in more competitive ones it is due to low-share lenders. Column (5) indicates that total credit decreases with exposure to both lender types: one standard deviation increase in exposure of 0.06/0.028 decreases credit by 2.9%/2.6% due to low-/high-share exposure. The average loan count is not affected in column (6), suggesting that the deterioration in credit results in smaller loan size. Column (7) separates the effect of exposure by market concentration.
The reductions in credit in the top HHI markets (3.7%) are due to high-share lenders, while those in competitive ones result from exposure to low-share lenders (4.2%). In the mid-HHI markets, both lead to decreases in tract credit: one standard deviation increase in exposure to low-/high-share lenders decreases credit by 2.5%/3.5%. Column (8) shows that the loan count is not affect, suggesting that credit contractions are driven by lower credit lines.
Individual banks contract in competitive and in more concentrated markets where competitors are closer. In the former, this occurs where banks have smaller shares, while in the latter the share is not important. The tract-level results are in line with this pattern since competitive markets experience biggest contractions. Contractions are also relatively substantial in concentrated markets and are driven by high-share banks. Total number of loans is not affected, indicating that businesses are not receiving less loans but smaller amounts.
Compared to fracking, there is no evidence that credit is affected only when both smalland high-share lenders are exposed. This implies that contractions are not strategic and primarily entail the scaling back of lending amounts and not completely eliminating lending to clients. The evidence cannot rule out that businesses are not substituting credit across banks albeit with a reduced overall credit amounts.
The results emphasize that expansions by small-share lenders improve overall credit conditions when a bigger set of exposed banks lend in concentrated markets. The estimates related to contractions highlight that small-share lenders generate more pronounced credit reductions in competitive markets and high-share lenders mostly impact concentrated markets. In each case only the amount of the average credit line is affected, suggesting that local lenders continue to lend to the same number of businesses.
Real Activity: I examine the effect on real activity using the number of business establishments by two-digit industry code in each tract from the County Business Patterns.
Since lending by small banks is unlikely to affect bigger businesses, I focus on those with less than 50 employees and designate them as small establishments. I estimate the following model excluding tracts with direct impact from fracking or booms: 
Y ind,e,m,t is log of total establishments in a tract m of industry ind and size e (relative to 50 employees). The establishments count is as of the end of year t. to small-share lenders in markets far/close to other competitors.
25 This allows to further investigate if activity is more sensitive when small-share lenders expand in markets close to competitors. In all cases, the exposure effects vary by establishment size and I report those for small businesses.
In the case of fracking, Table 6 shows that small businesses are positively impacted by credit supply expansions by both small-and high-share lenders. According to column
(1), one standard deviation increase in small-/high-share exposure of 0.92/1.04 leads to 1.1%/0.5% increase in small establishments. The negative interaction term suggests that the effects of exposure are higher when a tract has only small-or high-share exposed lenders and implies that when both are present firms may substitute credit. Columns (2) shows that expansions by high-share lenders increase real activity in the top HHI markets: one standard deviation increase leads to 1% increase in small establishments. The effect of small-share lenders in these markets is positive but only marginally significant. Small-share lenders have a significant impact on activity in the middle/bottom HHI markets: one standard deviation increase leads to 0.8%/1.2% increase in establishments. In column (3), I further examine if small-share lenders affect activity in markets close or far from competitors, for the mid HHI markets. 26 They increase activity in concentrated markets where borrowers are close to other competitors by 1.2% -as much as in competitive markets.
The evidence suggests that real activity is positively affected by supply shocks. Tract results are consistent with the individual allocation of bank capital. We see that activity increases in the top HHI markets with exposure to high-share lenders and marginally so to small-share ones. Bank evidence shows that high-share lenders in these markets expand in markets close to own branches. Tract evidence shows that this increase is related to the presence of exposed small-share lenders which contest markets where they lack information advantage. Together, the results suggest that in top HHI markets, total credit increases when 25 I use 0.90 as a cutoff for the index of distance to competitors to define far and close. 26 In the rest of the markets the interaction of market share and market concentration suggests that the high-share impact is in markets far from competitors and low-share one is close to competitors. I also estimate but do not report the full model and confirm that this is the case. a bigger set of local banks are exposed but real activity is primarily affected by the expansion by high-share lenders. A similar outcome occurs in the mid HHI markets in terms of total credit. In this case, low-share lenders have a bigger impact on real activity by successfully challenging incumbents and expanding close to competitors. In competitive markets, both credit and activity is driven by exposure to small-share lenders.
The evidence in the case of residential booms in Table 6 , indicates that credit reductions have a limited impact on real activity. The effect of average exposure in column (4) has a positive sign, implying that tracts experience an increase in activity during the reduction in total credit. When coefficients are allowed to vary by the HHI level, the effect of small-share exposure is positive and significant in the top/mid HHI markets, while this is the case for high-share exposure in the bottom HHI markets.
The results from individual bank responses and tract credit show that bigger-share lenders reduce credit more significantly in concentrated markets. One way to interpret the results here is to compare the change in activity across tracts with more small-share exposed lenders to tracts with more high-share exposed lenders. Since the former do not reduce credit significantly we can use them to quantify the relative impact on activity. This assumes that tracts which are not exposed at all are qualitatively different. By this measure, tracts, in concentrated markets, exposed to bigger decreases in credit by big-share lenders grow slower.
Instead, when comparing to other, unexposed tract, reductions in credit do not affect real activity. This suggests that businesses find alternative sources of credit. It is also likely, and supported by the evidence, that banks just reduce credit lines but still lend to new businesses.
Robustness and Extensions Geographic Portfolio Diversification
The reallocation of capital that follows bank exposure to each shock can be due to the bank incentive to geographically diversify the distribution of small business loans. This is an alternative interpretation of the results in the main section which deemphasizes the importance of relative local return. According to this hypothesis banks expand or contract credit in order to improve their geographic footprint and minimize exposure to local economic shocks. I explore this by calculating the GINI coefficient for the geographic distribution of the lending portfolio and examine whether it decreases after exposure to each shock. The results are listed in Table 7 . The effect of exposure is only significant for banks with relatively diversified lending and implies that banks become less diversified after expansions due to fracking (column 1). In the case of booms, the effect of exposure is positive and significant only for more geographically concentrated lenders. It implies that such banks become even less diversified after their reductions in credit. Both results suggest that exposed banks do not reallocate capital in order to diversify geographically. In both cases banks are less diversified after the capital shocks. This shows that geographic concentration and reallocations based on relative return are not consistent with each other.
Branch vs Branch-tract lending
The main results are based on lending at the level of the tract of the borrower. In this part, I aggregate all originations by each distinct branch and examine the effect of bank exposure on total branch lending. Instead of a branch-tract by year fixed effect I control for town by year effects based on the town of each branch. Comparison between estimates at the level of the branch and the branch-tract help identify the extent to which branches of exposed banks tend to lend in different tracts compared to unexposed ones. The results are listed in Table   7 . Column (2) is the main supply effect at the branch level and column (3) is the effect from the main results in the case of fracking. The estimates suggest that exposed banks tend to lend in tracts with permanently higher originations. Comparing columns (7) and (8), in the case of residential booms, we see that estimates are close and there is no evidence of such permanent differences in tract originations.
Market Share and Industrial Composition
The main results show that lending at low-share markets is more sensitive to bank capital shocks. In this section, I investigate which industries are more likely to be affected by this sensitivity. I extend the baseline tract-branch lending model by interacting the effect of market share with the tract share of industries for establishments with less than 50 employees.
The results are listed in Table 7 .
27 In the case of fracking, banks expand in small-share tracts when they have above-average concentration in manufacturing. The share appears to matter less for tract with higher share of administrative and support services. The higher share of manufacturing implies that further expansion by small-share lenders can increase profitability and helps support the interpretation that banks expand in markets with higher return. It also suggests that manufacturing establishments are more likely to be impacted by the credit supply shocks. In the case of residential booms, we see that banks contract more in low-share markets with higher concentration of construction, wholesale, retail, and health care. Banks reduce credit in markets outside of booms in order to increase originations within booming areas where residential prices are appreciating and construction is profitable.
The fact that they reduce more in tracts with higher share in construction suggest that they minimize their exposure to construction industries outside of the booming markets.
Supply Shocks and Changes in Competition
An alternative approach for identifying where different-share lenders expand or contract credit keeps track of average exposure and changes in concentration. Decreases in concen-27 I interact the shares of all industries over 3% but do not report the estimates for non-significant ones tration, holding tract exposure constant, indicate credit expansion by a set of small-share banks. Conversely, the bigger the set of expanding, low-share banks, the more concentration will decrease. I compute average tract exposure and use changes in the HHI after tract exposure. In the case of total credit, I estimate the following model in several versions: Tract Credit: With fracking, Table 8 shows that both total lending and number of loans increase with exposure. One deviation increase of 2.2 wells raises total small-bank credit/count by 6%/1.7%. The effect of change in concentration is not significant in either case. Lending increases in competitive markets: 8.3% more credit for one deviation increase in exposure, independent of concentration change. Decrease in concentration explains increases in number of loans: one deviation higher competition of 5% increases loan count by 2.6% with 2.2 wells exposure. This shows that the credit increase in concentrated markets from the main results is not driven by changes in concentration. It implies that both types of lenders need to be present in order to see increases in tract credit. This further confirms that improvement of credit results from small-share lenders contesting markets where big-share lenders also experience increased liquidity.
Credit deteriorates with tract exposure to residential booms. Column (5) indicates one deviation increase in exposure of 0.10 decreases lending by 5.7% and 5% increase in competition decreases lending by 11%. Total loans in column (6), are negatively affected only with increases in competition. For top HHI markets, higher competition leads to decreases in credit and number of loans. A 5% higher competition there decreases total credit/loan count by 16%/6.4%. This suggests that the decrease in credit due to contraction by big-share lenders in the main results can be partially attributed to reductions in concentration. There are no interactions between exposure by banks of different share, as with fracking.
Real Activity: Table 6 shows that small businesses are positively impacted by credit supply expansions. In column (1), one deviation increase in exposure of 2.2 wells leads to 1.8% increase in small establishments. Concentration is not significant in the baseline case.
When coefficients vary HHI, the effect is significant for tracts with lower concentration, both with a county/tract-level demand controls. A 5% reduction in concentration leads to a 0.3%/0.4% increase in small establishments. The positive effect is in addition of that of average exposure. Column (2) shows that exposure has a positive effect in all markets, while in column (3) it is significant in concentrated ones. Relative to the main results, the evidence here shows that increases in activity in concentrated markets do not occur with changes in concentration. Instead, both small-and big-share lenders increase credit, preserving their shares. At the same time, increases by big-share lenders drive activity in the top HHI markets, while small-share lenders are critical for activity in the mid/bottom HHI markets.
The evidence in the case of residential booms indicates that credit reductions have a limited impact on real activity. The effect of average exposure in column (4) has a positive sign, implying that tracts experience an increase in activity during the reduction in total credit. When coefficients vary with the HHI level, the effect of exposure is only marginally significant and positive. In more competitive markets, the effect of change in concentration is positive and significant. It implies that reductions in real activity occur only in cases when competition is reduced. This is consistent with the main results, which showed that, in competitive markets, activity is lower with higher exposure to small-share lenders compared to exposure to high-share ones. The estimates here suggest that the exist of small-share lenders reduces competition and can decrease activity.
Conclusion
This paper uses two of the well-documented local shocks, studied by this literature, and shows that the existing evidence regarding credit effects holds in the case of small business lending. I go beyond the average effect, documented in the existing studies, and show that banks reallocate capital in a strategic fashion. Credit is expanded by banks that overcome lower quality of information at distance, taking advantage of higher liquidity/lower deposit expense. They target low-share markets with higher marginal return to capital. Contractions occur in reverse -banks reduce where a higher share results in lower marginal return, and where information quality is lower. This emphasizes the interaction between the bank's ability to acquire soft information at a distance and its financial position. I show that supply shocks have asymmetric effects on activity due to the strategic fashion of capital allocation. Positive shocks not only increase supply across the network but also raise total market credit and activity. The results highlight a different aspect of the lending channel -credit supply shocks have real effects in markets where lenders have lower historic loan shares and use their improved financial position to offset lower market power. Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (1) and (2) are based on branch-level regressions using branch deposits. Exp S /Exp B in this case is the weighted total of new fracking wells in the proximity. Columns (3)- (8) Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.The results are based on tract-level lending for each branch. All regressions exclude branches and tracts which are directly affected by the local shocks. Exp S is the effect of exposure for banks with less than 30 branches. RelativeLoanSh is defined as the average small business loans share in the census tract over the previous two years scaled so that 0 is the average share for the bank across all tracts. A positive RelativeLoanSh reflects above bank-average share, while a negative RelativeLoanSh is below bank-average share. CloseT oLender = (1/(1+BorrowerDistance)) and RemoteCompete = 1 − (1/(1 + DistanceT oCompetitors)) are scaled distances to originating branch/distance to competition. Close to Competitors samples include tracts with RemoteCompete below 0.9/0.8 for fracking/residential booms. Far from Competitors samples includes tract not in the Close to Competitors samples. Errors clustered at the branch level. All regressions include controls for bigger banks which are not reported. Controls included in the estimation but not reported include: ln Assets t−1 , Deposits/Assets t−1 , Securities/Assets t−1 , C&I/Assets t−1 , Mortgages/Assets t−1 , Unused Loan Commitments/Assets t−1 , △ TotalBranches × Small Bank, △ TotalBranches × Big Bank, △I(Small Bank). Each of the controls is the quarterly average from the previous year. Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are based on tract level information for total credit from small and big banks. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) use the total amount of small business loans. The rest of the estimates are based on the total number of loans. T ractExp S,L /T ractExp S,H is the tract loan-weighted average exposure to small lenders with blowaverage/above-average lagged market shares. I(66 th < HHI t ), I(33 rd < HHI t ≤ 66 th ), and I(33 rd < HHI t ≤ 66 th ) are indicators for the relative competitiveness of the market based on the 33rd and 66th percentiles. All regressions include but do not report controls for exposure to big lenders. th ) are indicators for the relative competitiveness of the market based on the 33rd and 66th percentiles. All regressions include but do not report effect on big establishments, controls for exposure to big lenders and the △InvHHI effect for each bank size. Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Exp S is the effect of exposure for banks with less than 30 branches.ḠIN I is the bank average of loan concentration for each bank over the entire sample. LoanSh is defined as the average small business loans share in the census tract over the previous two years. CloseT oLender/RemoteCompete are scaled distance to originating branch/distance to competition as defined in the main text. Columns (1) and (6) are based on concentration of bank small business lending portfolio, defined as the GINI coefficient of tract loan concentration. Column (2) and (6) are based on branch-level lending and include a branch fixed effect and a town-ofbranch by year fixed effect. The rest are based on branch-tract loans. Sh refers to the share of the respective industry only for establishments with less than 50 employees. The table reports only the marginally significant shares. Controls included in the estimation but not reported include: ln Assets t−1 , Deposits/Assets t−1 , Securities/Assets t−1 , C&I/Assets t−1 , Mortgages/Assets t−1 , Unused Loan Commitments/Assets t−1 , △ TotalBranches × Small Bank, △ TotalBranches × Big Bank, △I(Small Bank). Each of the controls is the quarterly average from the previous year. Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are based on tract level information for total credit from small and big banks. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) use the total amount of small business loans. The rest of the estimates are based on the total number of loans. T ractExp s is the tract loan-weighted average exposure to small lenders. △InvHHI is the change in the inverse of HHI where 1 represents a perfectly competitive market. I(66 th < HHI t ), I(33 rd < HHI t ≤ 66 th ), and I(33 rd < HHI t ≤ 66 th ) are indicators for the relative competitiveness of the market based on the 33rd and 66th percentiles. All regressions include but do not report controls for exposure to big lenders and the △InvHHI effect for each bank size. 
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Matching Bank Networks Over the Sample Period
The final step in the creation of the dataset has to do with the associations of bank networks over time. It is customary in this literature to use a method called force-merging that will account for mergers and acquisitions of banks over the years. This method merges the balance sheet of two or more banks in the year before the merger occurs and thus maintain the relative size of the assets and liabilities between the two years. This paper deviates from this practice. In what is described above, I have assumed that a given client of a bank receives a loan from the closest super-branch of that bank. To use the force-merging method I will have to assume that the client of a bank can choose to go to a super-branch of the actual bank that has extended the loan or to a super-branch of the bank that merges with the first bank in the following period. This is obviously inconsistent. The method that this paper uses instead is to match the spatial distribution of a bank network at two different points in time. The nodes of a network of a bank in one year are matched with only those nodes that exist in the following year in the same location and belong to the same bank. The dataset, therefore, only includes observations for networks that report under the CRA for at least two consecutive years and at least one node of the network is in the same location between the two years.
Aggregation of Census Tracts to ZIP Code Areas
The CRA information is provided at the census tract level while the CBP information on the number of establishments is provided at the USPS ZIP code level. The census tracts are slightly smaller than the ZIP areas so I aggregate the CRA information to the ZIP code level. To do this I overlay the ZIP areas over the census tracts and compute the percentage of the area of each ZIP area that is comprised of each census tract that overlaps with the ZIP area. Average exposure is converted from the census tract level to the ZIP level using percentage of total area as a weight.
